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In the December 1984 edition of the Yale LawJournal, Beth S. Brinkmann,
a student commentator, advocated the implementation of a presumption of life
in capital sentencing.' Eight years after the Supreme Court determined in (nw
v GWia 2 that the death penaltydid not constitute cruel and unusual punishment,
Brinkmann argued that the analysis of capital sentencing should begin not with
the Eighth Amendment, but rather with the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.' From that starting point, she reached the conclusion that
procedural due process required that capital sentencing begin with a presumption
that the defendant was entitledto life imprisonment unless the prosecution could
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the death penaltywas the onlyappropriate
penalty for the defendant." In the eighteen years since that note was published,
it is readily apparent that the time has come for the practical application of the
presumption of life.
Although Brinkmann based her argument on an analysis of the Due Process
Clause, one can find support for the presumption of life in legal commentary,
statutes, and empirical studies. Since Brinkmann's work, several states have
expanded and refined their capital statutes. Moreover, the United States Supreme
*. JD. Candidate, May 2003, Washington & Lee University School of Law, BA, College
of William and Mary. This article is dedicated to lawrs committed to protecting due process of
the laws for all people. One of these people is Professor Roger Groot, who has been a mentor and
a role model to me. Special thanks to mydad, whose unflagging opposition to capital punishment
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1. Beth S. Brinkmann, Note, 7htP,%sm aai fL 0 A Stan Pbif3 aDtePmA nis
f Capa S t 94 YALE LJ. 351,352 (1984).
2. 428 US. 153 (1976).
3. Brinlunan, supm note 1, at 352; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 US. 153, 187 (1976) (reasoning
that "in the absence of more conclusive evidence,... the infliction of death as a punishment for
murder is not without justification and thus is not unconstitutionally severe").
4. Brinlmann, spra note 1, at 352-53.
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Court has changed the Due Process analysis of criminal cases with decisions such
as Apprei v NewJeney5 As courts and legislatures refine the process of capital
sentencing, and as empirical research reveals more problems inherent in various
levels of the capital system, the justification for a governing principle to effect
reform becomes more evident.
II. Ceriew
To presume life in a capital sentencing proceeding is simplyto presume that
life imprisonment is the appropriate penalty for the defendant unless the prose-
cution establishes, byevidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that the death penalty
is the appropriate sanction." The presumption of life is directly analogous to the
presumption of innocence that operates in the verdict phase of all criminal
proceedings. Courts have traditionally supported a mandatory presumption of
innocence through an examination of policy, precedent and positive law.'
Although courts have yet to require a presumption of life, the necessity of the
presumption of life becomes dear through a perusal of the same sources of law.
In order to support its claim that a court must charge a capital jury that it
will presume life imprisonment unless the prosecution meets its burden of
establishing that the death penaltyis necessary, this article examines jurispruden-
tial concerns, constitutional law, precedent, and statutory law. In Part III, the
article explains that philosophical consistencyand practical necessitymandate the
application of the presumption of life. In Part IV, the article demonstrates
textual support for the presumption in the Constitution and United States
Supreme Court jurisprudence. In Part V, the article illustrates that the Virginia
capital sentencing scheme incorporates and in fact requires the jury to presume
lie.8
III. JW46=fi&sfr & PZwqpcm eft #r
A. lix Pb csqiaicRascevTUnkyidx Uj tePnripI
If... the standard of proof for a criminal trial were a preponderance
of the evidence rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, there
would be a smaller risk of factual errors that result in freeing guilty
5. Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 US. 466, 490 (2000) (explaining that "any fact [other than
that of a prior conviction] that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt").
6. This argument proceeds from the assumption that there are instances in which a death
sentence would be appropriate-certainly an open question. This article does not express a view on
the issue of whether the death penalty is ever inappropriate, but merely recommends a new
procedural approach to the existing system
7. S, eg, Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 US. 478,490 (1978) (reaffirming the requirement of the
presumption of innocence through an examination of prior cases and scholarly works).
8. Sw VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4 (vfichie 2000) (providing, inter alia, that "[t]he penalty
of death shall not be imposed unless the Commonwealth shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt
[the statutory factors required for imposing a death sentence).
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persons, but a far greater risk of factual errors that result in convicting
the innocent. Because the standard of proof affects the comparative
frequencyof these two types of erroneous outcomes, the choice of the
staxidard to be applied m a particular kind of litigation should, in a
rational world, reflect an assessment of the comparative social disutility
of each.'
Our most basic understanding of the criminal law is derived from such
notions as "a person is innocent until proven guilty," or that the prosecution
must prove that the defendant is "guiltybeyond a reasonable doubt before a jury
of his peers."1" These bedrock concepts- "justice principles"- are grounded in
the philosophical concepts underlying the law. An examination of basic concep-
tions of justice demonstrates that the presumption of life tracks the philosophical
genesis of these justice principles.
The justice principles are based upon the notion that the protection of
liberty is so crucial that an individual's liberty interest outweighs the govern-
ment's interest in punishing criminals." This postulate was immortallyphrased
by Blackstone, who wrote that "it is better that ten guilty persons escape than
that one innocent suffer."12 Two priorities support the protective ideal: accuracy
and lenity, the notion that in the absence of clear evidence that a criminal tribunal
ought to err on the side of the defendant. Criminal justice then seeks first to
ensure that trials reach the correct result, and secondly, that, should a trial fail to
reach truth, that it err in such a way that is most protective of the defendant's
liberty interest.
9. In re Wimship, 397US. 358,371 (1970) (Harlan, J.,concurring).
10. Sa; eg, Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 US. 510, 513, 523 (1979) (reversing defendant's
conviction because of the jury instruction that "the law presumes a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntaryacts," impermissiblyconflicted with the presumption of innocence);
Ta)ior, 436 U.S. at 485 (explaining that "one accused of a crime is entitled to have guilt or innocence
determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial... and it long has been recog-
nized that ... the presumption [of innocence] is one way of impressing upon the jury the impor-
tance of that right"); W'mhip, 397 US. at 361 ("The requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be
established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years as a nation.");
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (The principle that there is a presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforce-
ment lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law."); McKenzie v. Risley, 842
F.2d 1525, 1545 (9th Cr. 1988) (en banc) (Fletcher, Pregerson, Canby and Monis, JJ., dissenting)
(explaining that the Due Process Clause requires that a defendant be found guilty only by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt and that failure to instruct the jury on the State's burdenof proof can
never be harmless error). Inasmuch as these are principles clearly articulated bylaw, they have also
been fully absorbed by popular culture.
11. Scott E. Sundby, TleRasareDcutRdeandhe Mamirg fInaym, 40 HASTINGS J.
457, 458 (1989) (explaining that the reasonable doubt rule provides an imbalance in favor of the
accused which "is a societal judgment that an individual's liberty interest transcends the state's
interest in obtaining a criminal conviction").
12. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358.
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The priorities of accuracyand lenity are both enforced through the imposi-
tion of the reasonable doubt rule in criminal trials. The requirement that the
prosecution prove every element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt is virtu-
ally axiomatic." The reasonable doubt rule ensures lenity by requiring that a
defendant receive the benefit of anyreasonable doubt. The rule ensures accuracy
through requiring that the prosecution meet a heavy evidentiary burden before
the state is permitted to impose punishment on the defendant.
Typically, the law requires parties seeking its intervention to meet an eviden-
tiary burden." Because the government seeks judicial intervention to deprive a
criminal defendant of his life, libertyor property, the government must establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's conduct merits punishment."5
The burden of proof essentiallyrequires that courts presume that legal interven-
tion is unnecessary unless the party seeking that intervention shows otherwise. 6
If the prosecution seeks to punish the defendant, then it must take affirmative
steps to establish the defendant's bad conduct with its own evidence. The
specified instances in which a criminal defendant must meet a burden of proof
are typically affirmative defenses, in which the defendant admits that his conduct
was factuallyunlawful, but asks the lawto recognize that there is either a justifica-
tion or an excuse for the conduct. Generally speaking, in these contexts, the
defendant's burden remains modest, usuallya preponderance standard, while the
prosecution maintains a continuous burden of proving all elements beyond a
reasonable doubt."8
13. Wvvmhi, 397 US. at 361 (noting 'virtuallyunanimous adherence to the reasonable-doubt
standard in common-law jurisdictions"). WuW,/ gave the reasonable doubt rule constitutional
significance. Id at 364.
14. RICiARD H. GASKiNs, BURDENS OF PROOF IN MODERN DISCOURSE 23 (1992)
("Tradidonallegalcomentaryhas been comfortable placing burdens on the partyseeking the law's
intervention: on the plaintiff in civil cases and on the prosecution in criminal trials.').
15. SeLeland v. Oregon, 343 US. 790,802-03 (1952) (Frankfutr,J., dissenting) ('Because
from the time that the law which we have inherited has emerged from dark and barbaric times, thecoetion of justice which has dominated our criminal law has refused to put an accused at the
of punishment if he fails to remove every reasonable doubt of his innocence in the minds
of jurors. It is the duty of the Government to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.").
16. Se GASKhsupm note 14,at 23.
17. SeCommonwealthv. Sands, 553 S.E2d 733,736 (Va. 2001) (explaining that self-defense
constitutes an implicit admission of responsibility and an assumption of the burden of establishing
that evidence of justification should raise reasonable doubt as to criminal liability).
18. See Patterson v. New York, 432 US. 197, 214-15 (1977) (upholding requirement that
defendant prove "extreme emotional disturbance" bya preponderance of evidence in order to be
found guiltyof manslaughter rather than murder); United States v. Davis, 260 F3d 965,969-70 (8th
Car. 2001) (holding that it does not violate the due process clause to require a defendant sentenced
under mandatory life sentence statute to prove that his prior convictions were nonqualifying
felonies); Harrell v. State, 65 S.W.3d 768, 770-71 (lex. Crim. App. 2001) (holding that it does not
violate due process to require defendant chaged with aggravated kidnapping to prove by a
preponderance of evidence that he vohintariy released the victim in a safe place because release is
not an element of the crime); Hodge v. Commonwealth, 228 S.E.2d 692,694 (Va. 1976) (approving
286 [Vol. 14:2
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The notion that the partyseeking legal intervention must prove the elements
of its case makes intuitive sense. The only risk to that party is the risk of non-
persuasion, which results in a judgment for the other party. Consider the result
if the law were to transfer the risk of non-persuasion to the defendant. The
result of the defendant's failure of proof is the loss of life, liberty or property,
while the party prosecuting the action bears no risk at all. Once the prosecutor
has met her burden of coming forward, she can sit back and require the defen-
dant to show cause whythe law should not act against him. Such a result would
be fundamentally inconsistent with due process.
Yet another procedural requirement seeks to preserve the priority of
accuracy-the requirement that juries be composed of individuals who are
"indifferent in the cause." 1 While the Sixth Amendment requires that criminal
defendants be tried by an impartial jury, state statutes and case law have often
required an even greater level of detachment.20 It is not enough for a juror to be
impartial in fact; the law requires that courts ensure that the jurors are detached
from the cause and can form no opinion on the case based on anything other
than the evidence presented at trial.21 The Supreme Court of Virginia recently
addressed the issue of juror impartiality in Grwe vu Cnrwwb,22 in which the
requirement that once Gommonwealth has proven the elements of second degree murderdefendant
bears "burden of showing circumstances of justification, excuse or allevation"); Dejamette v.
Commonwealth, 75 Va. 867,881 (1881) (holding that "[ilf [the defendant] relies on the defence [sic]
of insanity, he must prove it to the satisfaction of the jury"). In civil cases, however, the defendant
may bear a more substantial burden, as in the doctrine of res ipsa loquimur and the theory of strict
liability. GASKINS, s"ima note 14, at 27.
19. VA. CODE ANN. S 8.01-358 (Michie 2000) (providing that "if it shall appear to the court
that the juror does not stand indifferent in the cause, another shall be drawn or called and placed
in his stead for the trial of that cause").
20. U.S. CGOMi.T. amend. VI; VA. CODE ANN S 8.01-358; sw, eg, Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S.
719, 727 (1992) (-mhe right to ajurytrialguarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial bya panel
of impatl, 'indifferent' jurors."); United States v. Polichemi, 201 F.3d 858, 859 (7th Or. 2000)
(holding that the trial court erred in not excusing for cause a juror who had been an employee of
the United States Attorney prosecuung the case); Green v. Commonwealth, 546 SE.2d 446,452
(Va. 2001) (hokling that jurorexpressing intent to impose death penaly on a mere finding of guilt,
and juror who expressed belief in guilt of defendant were not qualified to serve); Medici v. Com-
monwealth, 532 SX.2d 28,32 (Va. 2000) (holding that juror whose husband had been murdered
by an individual represented by the same attorney as the defendant was not qualified to serve,
alhough she expressed unequivocal abilityto be objective); Cantrell v. Cews, 523 S.E.2d 502,504
(Va. 2000) (holding that juror represented by the same firm as that of plaintiffs attorney is not
ualified); seaso MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. cb. 234, S 28 (West 2000 roviding that [ t court
fids that the juror does not stand indifferent in the case, another shall be called in his stead"); RI.
GEN. LAs S 9-10-14 (1997) (providing for the exclusion of any juror not standing "indifferent in
the cause" and that counsel for either partymay not ) recluded from examining veniremen); S.C
CODE ANN. 5 14-7-1020 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2001) ('If it appears to the court that the juror is not
indifferent in the cause, he must be placed aside as to the trial of that cause and another must be
called.-).
21. VA. (oDE ANN. S 8.01-358 0(lie 2000).
22. 546 SY2d 446 (Va. 2001).
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court reversed the capital murder conviction of Kevin Green on the grounds that
the circuit court abused its discretion by refusing to excuse two prospective
jurors who expressed bias against the defendant.2' The court held that a defen-
dant has a right to a jurythat is "indifferent in the cause" and that any reasonable
doubt as to the impartiality of a juror must be resolved in favor of the
defendant.24 In determining that one of the jurors was not qualified because he
was not indifferent in the cause due to his predisposition to impose death, the
court explained that the juror's strong inclination toward death reflected a "fixed
opinion about the punishment that the defendant should receive."2" In its
discussion of the second juror, the court explained that, despite the juror's
understanding that the defendant was presumed innocent and that the Common-
wealth bore the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the fact that
she persisted in her belief of the defendant's probable guilt was a manifestation
of "firm opinions which would have impaired her ability to be impartial and
stand indifferent in the cause."26 Gmre demonstrates that a manifestation of
impartiality is not sufficient to qualify a juror to sit; it is essential that the juror
hold no opinions, as to either guilt or sentence, which would impair the juror's
ability to be impartial, or would create the appearance of partiality27
Although the ideal juror would be totally detached from the cause, in reality
even the totally impartial juror has his own preconceptions and predilections
which are in no way based on the competent evidence presented at trial, but
could yet factor into the decision. Thus, in order to make jurors as detached as
possible, the law limits that which jurors "know" by creating presumptions. An
evidentiary presumption limits the jury by its absence; before the party bearing
the burden of establishing the basic fact meets its burden, the jury is not permit-
ted to infer the ultimate fact.2 The presumption of innocence has a more direct
knowledge limiting effect. The jury is explicitly instructed that it may consider
only that the defendant is innocent until the prosecution has met its burden of
persuasion.29
23. Green v. Commonwealth, 546 S.E2d 446,447 (Va. 2001).
24. Id at 452.
25. Id
26. Id
27. See Medici v. Commonweakh, 532 S.E.2d 28, 31 (Va. 2000) (explaining that permitig
a juror whose husband had been murdered by a former client of defense counsel would "weaken
public confidence in the integrity of criminal trials").
28. SeJOSHUADRESSLER, UIDERSTANDING QUM-IAL LAW 65 (2d ed. 1995) (describing
a permissive presumption as an instance in which "the factfinder may... find the existence of the
presumed fact, upon proof of the basic fact").
29. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485-86 (1978) (explaining that "the purging effect of
an instruction on the presumption of innocence simply represents one means of protecting the
accused's constitutional right to be judged solely on the basis of proof adduced at trial").
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B. Phapliiw1C ziter.yi~f tbe Thmw~pimmqfLje
The process of capital sentencing implicates a defendant's most fundamen-
tal right-life. If the justice principles are founded on the notion that an individ-
ual's liberty interest must receive greater protection than the government's
interest in criminal convictions, then it follows that an individual's interest in his
life ought to receive greater protection than the government's interest in obtain-
ing death sentences. For the same reasons that the presumption of innocence
has axiomatic weight in the trial of fact, the presumption of life is a necessityin
a capital sentencing proceeding.
Although the sentencing authority will surely know that the defendant has
been convicted of murder, it is nevertheless necessary to eliminate irrelevant
information that could prejudice the sentencing authority. In many states,
including Virginia, where the trial jury has the responsibility of deciding whether
to impose death, the sentencing authority has been exposed to the evidence
necessary to convict the defendant prior to making its decision as to sentence.
Although the jury must have some knowledge of the circumstances of the crime
and the defendant in order to impose a sentence at all, there should be a proce-
dural device in place to prevent the juryfrom pre-decidinr sentence on the basis
of evidence to which it was exposed in the guilt phase. Because there is no
individualized voir dire between the guilt phase and the sentencing phase, a juror.
would be free to decide, after conviction, that the defendant committed the
crime, that the crime was vile and inhuman, and that death is the onlyappropriate
penalty. When a juror makes such a decision, the defendant is automatically
denied the process to which he is entitled in the sentencing phase. Virginia law
requires that jurors be impartial as to sentence, but there remains no such
mechanism to preclude jurors from making early decisions. 1 The presumption
of life would serve this purpose in the same manner in which the presumption
of innocence functions in the guilt phase-by informing the jury that it is to
presume life to be the appropriate penalty. The presumption would theoretically
counterbalance the assumptions the jurymayhave formed as it returned its guilty
verdict. Just as the presumption of innocence requires the jurors to lay aside
consideration of arrest and indictment, the presumption of life would require the
jurors to lay aside consideration of conviction that leads to the conclusion that
death is the only, or even the probably, appropriate penalty.2
30. SieWiliamJ. Bowers, et al., FendwdInap ity in Q $aSermza Juros' iurn,
Guit. Ta1Expfewandwm=DitmMakir 83 CORNELLLREv. 1476,1488 (1998) [hereinaf-
terFowdMI npvaky]. Bowers, et al, found that 48.3% of jurors in their survey indicated that
they had made up their minds as to sentence at the end of the guilt phase of the trial Id Among
Virginia jurors surveyed, 47.7 % indicated that they had decided sentence at the end of the guilt
phase, and of these, 18.2% indicated that they had settled on the death penalty. Id
31. VA. CODE ANN. S 8.01-358 (vfichie 2000); seeaso Green v. Commonwealth, 546 S1E.2d
446, 452 (Va. 2001).
32. Taylorv. Kentucky, 436 US. 478,485 (1970) (citing 9JOHNWIGMORE, EVIDENCF 407
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Furthermore, the presumption would function to preserve the proper
allocation of the burden of proof. Because of the problem of jurors formulating
opinions as to sentence at the end of the guilt phase, it follows then that in the
minds of such jurors the defendant would face the burden of proving himself
ineligible for death. Such a result would be inconsistent with a capital sentencing
scheme that requires the prosecution to establish the aggravating factors neces-
sary to support a death sentence beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, the
natural consequence of requiring the defendant to prove himself ineligible for
death pragmaticallywould relieve the prosecution of meeting its burden of proof
and allocate the risk of non-persuasion to the defendant. The defendant would
be compelled to introduce competent mitigating evidence to persuade the jury
that his crime does not rise to the level that ought to be punished by death.
Although the defendant possesses de jure rights to remain silent and not to
present evidence, in fact his failure to show why he should not be put to death
could cost him his life." The presumption of life, however, would preserve the
defendant's rights to remain silent and affirmatively state the prosecution's
burden of rebutting the presumption of life.
The jury's task in the penaltyphase of a capital trial is to determine whether
the defendant is a member of that subset of defendants convicted of capital
murder who are deserving of the death penalty." This determination is a subse-
quent determination of guilt or innocence. After determining whether the
defendant is a member of the larger class ofthose convicted of capital murder,
the jury's task is to determine whether statutory aggravating factors exist that
separate the defendant into the smaller class of those guilty of the most serious
commissions of murder. 6 Because the penaltyphase has this narrowing purpose,
the correct phrasing of the axiom in this context is that it is better to imprison
for life ten people "guilty of death than put to death one person "innocent" of
death. TIhe effect. of an incorrect result is that a person guilty of murder, but
undeserving of death, could be subjected to death.
The application of the reasonable doubt standard to capital sentencing
reflects the legislative intent to determine correctlywhich defendants are worthy
(3d ed. 1940)).
33. SeeVA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4 (Q) (Micrhie 2000) (providing that "the penalty of death
sa/atl nt ilm paiunless the Commonwealth shall prove ktauda mnuacnzedwW either the future
dangerousness of the defendant or the vileness of the offense (emphasis added)).
34. SUS.CoMT.annd. VC(Nopenon... shall be compelled in anycriminal case to be
a witness against himself."); Malloyv. Hogan, 378 US. 1, 3 (1964) (incorporating the Fifth Amend-
rnt self-incrimination clause against the states); Griffin v. California, 380 US. 609, 613 (1965)
(holding that prosecutor's comment on the defendant's failure to testify violates the defendant's
right against incriminating himnself).
35. SiePhyllis L Czocker, Camps fQ dd'tyaxdDumtnb.s: DoB us a Guit
andPwsn*m inD PAmyGzsa, 66 FORDHAmL REv. 21,23 (1997) (arguing that capitaljuries
should evaluate each defendant individually as to the sentencing decision).
36. Id at 30.
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of death and which are worthyof life imprisonment." The gravityof the defen-
dant's crime makes it difficult, however, for judges and juries to isolate those
issues relevant to the determination of guilt fromthose relevant to the determina-
tion of penalty.8 Because the obvious objective of the sentencing phase is to
determine whether the defendant fits in the subset of capital muderers worthy
of death, the logical approach is to structure the sentencing phase as a freestand-
ing inquiryin which the predicate offense, and the circumstances thereof, are but
a portion of the evidence subject to the jury's consideration. In this new inquiry,
it is clear that the defendant is guilty of murder, but the jury must find, beyond
a reasonable doubt, whether the defendant's crime makes him eligible for death.
In this new inquiry, subject to the reasonable doubt standard, the jury ought to
presume that the defendant does not fit within this smaller subset of defendants
until the prosecution has met its burden of proving that he does. 9
C 71l PraacalNezszty qdx Pt3w~tim fL4f
The jury is a human institution. It is incapable of making detached, logical
conclusions and it is incapable of divining absolute truth. Rather, it is subject to
37. The United States Congress, the General Assembly of Virgina and a number of legisla-
tures in other states have elected to impose a reasonable doubt standard for the government's proof
of the statutorilyrequired factors for the death sentence. Se 18 U.S.C S 3593(c)(2000) ("The
burden of establishing the existence of any aggravating factor is on the government, and is not
satisfied unless the existence of such factor is established beyond a reasonable doubt."); VA. CODE
ANN. S 192-264.4(Q (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the vileness or future danger-
ousness factors to impose death penalty); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. S 16-11-103(2)(a)(I) (West 1996)
(requiring sentencing panel uanimously to find proof of at least one aggravating factor beyond a
reasonable doubt before imposition of death sentence); GA. CODE ANN. S 17-10-30(c) (1997)
(providing generally that the death penalty may not be imposed unless the jury finds one or more
statutory aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt); N.Y. QuM. PROC LAW 5 400.27(11)(a)
(McKinney2001) (providing that "[t]he jurymaynot direct imposition of a sentence of death unless
it unanimously finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating ... factors substantially
outweigh the mitigating. .. factors established ... and unanimously determines that the penalty of
death should be imposed"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. S 2929.03(1)(1) (West 1997) (providing that
"[tlhe prosecution shall have the burden of proving, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
aggravating circumstances ... are sufficient to outweigh the factors in mitigation of the imposition
of the sentence of death"); S.C CODE ANN. S 16-3-20(Q (Law. Co-op. 2001) (providing that
"[u]nless at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances .. . is found [beyond a reasonable
doubt], the death penalty must not be imposed"); TENN. CODE ANN. S 39-13-204(f)(1) (2001)
(providing for life imprisonment if the jury finds that the state failed to prove any statutory
aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt).
38. Se Crocker, sm note 35, at 79 (illustrating that "courts too often treat the punishment
inquiry as a restatement of the guiltyverdict").
39. Q. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 US. 478,486 n. 13 (explaining the value of the presumption
of innocence as a protection of a defendant's entitlement to conviction only by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt).
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emotional, visceral responses to the evidence and the manner in which it is
presented. Societyhas accepted this as a consequence of the system of justice it
has chosen to adopt. Nevertheless, the structure of the legal system is designed
to keep this emotional response within limits. It is one thing for a jury to be
persuaded by an effective advocate and quite another for the jury to respond to
its passions. The need for such limitations in general demonstrates a very
practical basic need for a presumption of life in capital sentencing proceedings.
In order to understand the risk of failing to properly guide jurydiscre-
tion in a capital case, it is useful to examine the traditonal role of the
juryin American law .... Juries consist of ordinary citizens called on
any given day, in any state, and in federal or county courthouses to
resolve disputes of all kinds between people or entities. Their respon-
sibilities range from deciding whether a-human being should be de-
stroyed for criminal conduct to deciding petty squabbles between
neighbors. Without waping a carjenter, fisherman, or salesman could
be sittin in judgment for a multi-national corporation or a homeless
vagrant.-
Perhaps the overriding reason for implementing the presumption of life is
the need to control the discretion of capital juries. The fact that jurors are
human beings who bring their own concerns, anxieties and uncertainties to the
process frustrates the law's attempts to empanel totally impartial jurors.41
Moreover, juror opinions on the imposition of the death penalty tend to vary
based on arbitrary factors such as race, socioeconomic status and religion.42
Because selection for jury service is, at least initially, a random process, and
because these arbitrary factors tend to affect jurors' preconceived notions of the
death penalty, it stands to reason that there are a variety of different results that
could occur at sentencing based on factors other than the evidence produced in
the proceeding.
The consequent variety of possible reasons behind a jury's decision to
impose death makes being sentenced to death nearly as predictable as being
"struck bylightning."43 While the appearance of due process maybe present, the
truth remains that some residual effects of the arbitrary conditions of the jurors
will have an effect on the verdict. A defendant stands a greater probability of
being sentenced to death in a jurisdiction primarily composed of low-income
whites than in a jurisdiction primarilycomposed of higher-income blacks.44 This
40. Jos Filip, Anderson, W mdx Wallz Fara D dao q'Faa i dSufnzivcfCApWt
J1ne, 26 OHIO N.U. L REV. 741, 749-50 (2000).
41. SeeWiliamJ. Bowers, 7he C0 urJwyh' Rticm wD4ijadPwiwofEaryFi&rV,
70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1071 (1995) (explaining that "ambiguity, uncertainty and anxiety may be an
invitation to whim and arbitrariness, regardless of statutory guidelines").
42. Theodore Eisenberg, et al., The DedJyParadox qcfupajwws, 74 S. CALL. REV. 371,
380-87 (2001).
43. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
44. Eisenberg, sspa note 42, at 385-86.
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unacceptable consequence could be remedied substantiallybya guiding principle
which diminishes the effects of these arbitrary factors.
A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the charac-
ter and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the
particular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate
punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or nitigating
factors stemming from the diverse frailties ofhumankind. It treats
persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual
human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferehtiated mass to
be subjected7to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.4"
One such preconceived notion that the presumption of life would amelio-
rate is the notion that death is the only acceptable penalty for certain crimes.'
A substantial number of jurors come to the process with the notion that there
are certain crimes for which death is the only acceptable penalty.47 Jurors holding
such a belief are not fullycapable of weighing aggravating factors against mitigat-
ing factors to reach a conclusion other than that death is the appropriate penalty.
Such jurors, in fact, are more likely to impose death in every instance in which
a defendant was found to be guilty.
8
The fact that individual jurors harbor preconceived views on the application
of the death penaltyis magnified because of those jurors' abilityto influence the
tenor of deliberations and the positions of their colleagues as to sentence.49 Jury
deliberations permit those jurors with strongly held preconceived notions tointimidate those jurors who remain undecided into approving those views. 0 In
45. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 US. 280, 304 (1976).
46. Bowers, Fo. inaedlffaniA s" note 30, at 1504.
47. Id The investigators found that among capitaljurors surveyed, 70.4% believed death to
be the onlyacceptable penaltyfor a murder committed bysomeone previouslyconvicted of murder,
57.0% believed death to be the only acceptable penalty for a premeditated murder, and 52.0%
believed death to be the only acceptable penalty for mukiple murders. Id at 1505. The investiga-
tors further found a correlation between the number different crimes for which a juror would deem
death to be the only appropriate penalty and the tendency to favor death at the end of the guilt
phase of trial. Id at 1507.
48. Id at 1511-12.
49. Id at 1525. The investigators found that some jurors had used the deliberations of the
guilt phae as an opportunity to e t gs others about imposing the death
penalty" Id A Texas juror reported that "[a] few ofte didn't know if they could sentence aperson to death and that's when we were using persuasive tactics[, saying that] the judge is the one
who wil pronounce the sentence." Id Life jurors, on the other hand, saw the guilt phase delibera-
tions as an opportuity to bargain for a life sentence. Id at 1527. An Alabama juror stated that
"[t ]o sell the two [holdoutsl we won't go for death [ sic) penalty They said we made an agreement."
Id
50. i d at 1523. The investigators interviewed a number of jurors in capital cases to investi-
gate the influences of pro-death jurors as to sentence during the guilt phase deliberations. Id The
investigators found that pro-death jurors typically advocated the death penaly when considering
whether the defendant was guilty of the offense. a The juror responses included the following:
CA juror. Even though they weren't supposed to, there was some angry people in
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such cases, the ability of a juror to function independently as a rational decision
maker is foreclosed in the absence of a strong guiding principle.
An additional rationale for controlling the discretion of capital juries is the
concept of residual, or lingering, doubt. Residual doubt occurs when jurors have
a sufficient level of doubt as to the accuracy of the guilt proceeding that theyare
hesitant to impose a death sentence s1 Jurors frequendycite residual doubt as the
primary factor in voting for life rather than death. 2 If jurors harbor some doubt
as to the actual guilt of the defendant, or the defendant's death eligibility, it would
be inconsistent with a capital sentencing scheme that requires proof of aggravat-
ing factors beyond a reasonable doubt not to instruct the jurors as to how they
ought to consider that doubt. Courts have not, however, generally recognized
residual doubt as an appropriate issue on which to instruct the jury.F The
presumption of life would help jurors in managing residual doubt by affirming
the prosecution's burden of proving the death-efigibilkyof the defendant beyond
a reasonable doubt.
The reality of the jury system is that jurors are "amateur judges," who
cannot be released to perform their weighty tasks without specific guidance.
54
The presumption of innocence has long served as a maxim accessible to the
layman which helps a juror understand how to decide cases at the guilt phase.
Once the defendant is adjudged guilty, this presumption obviously is no longer
a factor in the minds of the jurors. It is nevertheless logical to provide a similarly
there, there was some people screaming, "Hang himer" "Wel shoot the bastard!" You
know?
SC juror They wanted to go and hang him immediately, most of them
TX juror. The son of a bitch ought to be hung.
FL juron At fist they all wanted death, theywanted to frythose blckboys .... They
fek lie these two black boys took a white man's life, we're going to burn them that's
the impression I got from a lot of the jurors ... I really believed they wanted to bum
both of those guys because theywere black and because the white defendant had a plea
bargain and we didn't even hear his testimony.
Id
51. Christina S. PignatelliRidmdW It's a L # Saw, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 307, 308 (2001).
52. Se id at 314 (citing William S. Geimer &Jonathan Amsterdam, Wb4ryJw VcteLror
Dazx qmmzteFamux m TmFlkida Deab PmeIy raes, 15 AK J. uM L 1,28(1987-88)).
53. Id. at 312-13. Buts )United States v. Davis, 132 F. Supp. 2d 455, 468 (E.D. La. 2001)
(granting defendants' motions to argue residual doubt to the jury, noting that "(i]he belief that such
an ultimate and final penahyis inappropriate where there are doubts as to guilt, even if they do not
rise to the level necessaryfor acquittal, is a feeling that stems from common sense and fundamental
notions of justice");State v. Hrtman, 42 S.W3d44,57 (Tenn.2001) (hol ha in cases inwhich
"the proffered residual doubt proof is m nt of testimony of the onlywitess who offered
direct ... proof of the defendant's involvement in the crime, such proof is clearly relevant and
admissible to establish residual doubt as a mitigating circumstance"); State v. Teague, 897 S.W2d
248, 256 (Team 1995) (holding that state law required trial court to permit defendant to present
evidence going to residual dolt at a re-sentencing hearing).
54. Anderson, srj note 40, at 751,776 (explaining S reme Gourt jurisprudence in captal
cases as a recognition that "jurors cannot be trusted with the information or be left with
guidance about information which has been determined relevant to its decision*).
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strong guiding principle to control the jury's discretion during the capital sentenc-
ing process.
IV. 71m Casmiond Sgign4 cf dx PawqmicfL Ci
A. Sipme Cw JunJpnd 1 on P7w jwm x andr dxReis lce
The positive law justification for the presumption of life comes from the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Supreme
Court has held that the presumption of innocence has constitutional significance
because the Due Process Clause "must be held to safeguard 'against dilution of
the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and beyond a
reasonable doubt."'"5 The familiar language of the Fourteenth Amendment
precludes a state from "depriv(ing] anyperson of life, libertyor property, without
due process of law."' It follows that as the presumption of innocence stands as
a shield to prevent the deprivation of a defendant's liberty without due process,
so too should the presumption of life protect the defendant from the deprivation
of his life without due process of law.'7
The fact that due process protects the interests of the individual defendant
against those of the government unless the evidence against the defendant is
overwhelming is a hallmark of the American system of justice. Inasmuch as the
requirement that the prosecution meet its burden of proof ensures accuracy and
consistency, it also ensures fairness as defendants under the American system of
law have come to rely on the notion that they may require the government to
establish guilt before being subjected to punishment.
It is also important in our free societythat everyindividual going about
his ordinar affairs have confidence that his government cannot
adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper
fa&finder of his guilt with utmost certainty.5
Although the Supreme Court has never held that the presumption of life has
constitutional significance, it follows from the Court's jurisprudence on the
reasonable doubt rule that the presumption of life is required for procedural due
process. The Court first held that the reasonable doubt rule had constitutional
significance in In re WVhi. 59 In Wuvh4l, the Court reversed the finding of
delinquencyof a juvenile in which the familycourt judge relied on a statute which
55. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 US. 478,486 (1978) (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 US. 501,
503 (1976)).
56. US. Q)NST. amend. XIV.
57. 9. Tr, 436 US. at 486 (1978) (explaining that instructing a juryon the presumption
of innocence is *one means of protecting the accused's constitutional right to be judged solely on
the basis of proof adduced at trial").
58. In e W'nship, 397 US. 358, 364 (1970).
59. Id at 364.
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provided for a finding of delinquency by a preponderance of the evidence.6
Citing precedent dating back to 1881, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority,
explained that "[tihis notion-basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a
free society-is a requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the his-
toric, procedural content of due process." 6' Justice Brennan noted further that
the reasonable doubt rule existed not only to ensure the accuracy of criminal
convictions, but also to protect the individual defendant from the erroneous loss
of liberty and the stigma associated with a criminal conviction. 2 Concurring
specially, Justice Harlan further noted that:
It is onlybecause of the nearlycomplete and long-standing acceptance
of the reasonable-doubt standard-by the States in cfimi&l trials that
the Court has not before todayhad to hold explicitlythat due process,
as an expression of fundamental procedural fairness, requires a more
stringent standard for criminal trial than for ordinaryciv1" litigation."
Wmship articulated the standard that the prosecution must prove "beyond a
reasonable doubt... everyfact necessaryto constitute the crime with which [the
defendant] is charged.""
The Court has also consistently held that the presumption of innocence, as
a component of the reasonable doubt rule, mayhave constitutional significance
because it "is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal
justice," and "its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our
criminal law."61 In Estelle v Wilianr, the defendant, charged with assault with
intent to commit murder, was required to attend his trial in prisoner's clothing,
even though he asked toQ be permitted to wear civilian attire." The Court,
although unwilling to declare the State's conduct per se unconstitutional, held
that requiring a defendant to appear in prison attire at trial unconstitutionally
inhibits the presumption of innocence. 7 In Ta>ior'u Keawiey, the Court held that
the trial judge abused his discretion by refusing to instruct the jury that "the law
presumes a defendant to be innocent of a crime."6 In Talor, the Court ex-
plained that in instances in which the prosecution invites the jury to make
60. IM at 360, 368.
61. Id at 362.
62. Id at 363.
63. Id at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring.
64. Id at 364.
65. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895); se also Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 US.
478, 486 (1978) (holding, on the facts of the case, that trial court's refusal to give presumption of
innocence instruction violated the defendant's rights under the Due Process Clause); Estelle v.
Williams, 425 US. 501,504-05 (1976) (recognizing that the requirement that a defendant appear in
prison clothing may impair the presumption of innocence).
66. Este, 425 US. at 502.
67. Id at 505.
68. Ti.or, 436 U.S. at 480,490.
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assumptions of the defendant's guilt on the basis of his status as a defendant, and
on the basis of the arrest and indictment, the Due Process Clause requires that
the trial court instruct the juryon the presumption of innocence.69 Although the
Court limited its holding to the facts of the case, Justice Brennan, concurring
specially, opined that "trial judges should instruct the jury on a criminal defen-
dant's entitlement to a presumption of innocence in all cases where such an
instruction is requested."7" The Tajorcourt also explained that the presumption
of innocence is essentially a shorthand to explain the duty of the prosecution to
meet its burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.7'
The fact that the Court has embraced and fortified the presumption of
innocence in this manner is not surprising, considering the philosophical history
underlying the notion. The Court, in each of the aforementioned cases, rein-
forced the central notion that the prosecution must prove each element of its
case beyond a reasonable doubt in order to establish the government's entitle-
ment to impose punishment." The notion that the presumption of innocence
is a component of the reasonable doubt rule logically supports the presumption
of life as well. The Due Process Clause has consistently required that the prose-
cution meet this reasonable doubt burden. The burden then should not be
relaxed or lifted when the government seeks to end a defendant's life. Rather,
in prosecutions in which the legislature has defined facts which a jury must
affirmativelyfind before the imposition of punishment, due process requires the
prosecution, and not the defendant, to meet the burden of persuasion." As
discussed below, the Supreme Court has illustrated obliquely that the presump-
tion of life bears the same constitutional significance as the Wmhip doctrine.
69. Id at 487-88.
70. Id at 491 (Brennan, J., concurring); sw a/so Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 US. 786, 791
(1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (explaining that "because every defendant, regardless of the totality
of the cicurstances, is entitled to have his guik determined only on the basis of the evidence
properly introduced against him at trial, I would hold that an instruction on the presumption of
innocence is constitutionally required in every case where a timely request has been made"). But
see Ammt 441 U.S. at 789 (per curiam opinion) (holding that failure to instruct on the presumption
of innocence is not per se unconstitutional, but that such failure "must be evaluated in light of the
totality of the circumstances").
71. Ta*jlor, 436 US. at 483 n.12.
72. Id at 486 (explaining that the Due Process Clause "must be held to safeguard 'against
dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and beyond a reason-
able doubt" (quoting Estdle, 425 U.S. at 503)).
73. Se Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 US. 466,490 (2000) (explaining that "it is unconstitu-
tional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that [expose the defendant
to a higher penalty] and such facts must be [proved] beyond a reasonable doubt").
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B. 7e B ,rata Tial
In Gmev Geagja,' the Supreme Court approved the bifurcation of capital
nunder trials into separate guilt and sentencing proceedings."5 The majority in
GEW explained that jury sentencing in a unitary capital murder trial "created]
special problems," in that "[m]uch of the information that is relevant to the
sentencing decision mayhave no relevance to the question of guilt, or may even
be extremely prejudicial to a fair determination of that question."76 The bifur-
cated proceeding, however, enables the jury first to hear and consider all the
evidence relevant to a finding of guilt or innocence, then after determining guilt,
have an opportunity independently to weigh evidence relating to appropriate
punishment." The bifurcated proceeding then consists of two trials, one in
which the prosecution must prove the defendant's guilt, and then, in the event
of conviction, one in which the prosecution subsequently must prove that the
defendant should be sentenced to death.
The Geg majority recognized the need to guide a jury in the sentencing
proceeding.
Since the members of a jurywill have had litte if any, previous experi-
ence in sentencing, they are unlikely to be skilled ii dealing with the
information they are given .... t seems clear, however, that the
problem will be alleviated if the jury is given guidance regarding the
factors about the crime and the defendafit that the State, representing
organized society, deems particularly relevant to the sentencing deci-
sion.78
Certainly, in weighing the factors relevant to sentencing, the jury requires a
central principle similar to the central principle of the guilt phase-that the
prosecution must prove all the elements of its case beyond a reasonable doubt,
and that the defendant may"remain inactive and secure, until the prosecution has
taken up its burden and produced evidence and effected persuasion.""
The presumption of life achieves this purpose. First, the presumption
would in theory make the jury a clean slate. Although the jury would (indeed,
should) be aware of the guilt of the offense, the presumption would work against
prejudice toward sentence developed during the guilt phase of the trial. The jury
would not be foreclosed totally from considering the circumstances of the
offense, but would be reminded to consider the circumstances of the defendant
as equally important evidence in sentencing. The presumption of life would,
however, channel the jury's consideration of the circumstances of the offense.
74. 428 US. 153 (1976).
75. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 US. 153, 195 (1976).
76. Id at 190.
77. Id at 191.
78. Id at 192.
79. Taior, 436 US. at 484 n.12 (quoting 9 JOHN WIGMORE, EVIDENCE S 2511 (3d ed.
194o)).
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By structuring the inquiryin this manner, the jurywill be able independentlyto
consider whether the prosecution has proven not only the factual guilt of the
defendant, but also has proven his death-worthiness.
Secondly, the presumption would act as an ordering principle to direct the
presentation of evidence in the sentencing phase. The defendant's conviction of
capital murder could have the effect of re-ordering the burdens of proof in such
a manner that the defendant must show that he is not death-worthy-an outcome
repugnant to principles of due process. Byinstructing the juryon the presump-
tion of life, the court would firmly establish the proper manner in which the jury
should weigh and consider the evidence presented. Under the current system,
in which a capital jury must divine an ordering principle for its deliberations,
jurors determine independendythe weight to assign evidence adduced in the guilt
phase and evidence adduced in the sentencing phase. The instruction that the
jury must presume life as the appropriate penalty requires that the juryfind that
the prosecution met its burden of proof during the sentencing phase and not to
base its sentencing decision entirelyon evidence adduced during the guilt phase.
Moreover, the presumption would give the jury a much needed paradigm to
follow when the evidence does not produce a clear result for either party. In
such a case, it seems logical that if the jurycannot with certainty declare death to
be the appropriate penalty, it would be preferable to err on the side of lenity.
The Court's approval of the bifurcated proceeding includes a corollary
suggestion that the defendant be afforded the same procedural safeguards in the
sentencing phase that he received in the guilt phase. InBu1gnv Misscri, 8° the
Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prevented
the State from seeking the death penaltyin a retrial of the defendant after the jury
in the initial trial imposed a life sentence."' After explaining that the Court had
long resisted the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to all sentencing
proceedings, the Court illstrated that the unique nature of the capital sentencing
proceeding required the provision of Double Jeopardyprotections. 2 The Court
noted that:
[Tihe prosecution [did not] simply recor end what it felt to be an
appropriate punishment. It undertook the burden of establishing
certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt in its quest to obtain the
harsher of the two alternative verdicts. The presentence hearing
resembled, and, indeed, in all relevant respects was like the immedf-
80. 451 US. 430 (1981)
81. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 US. 430,446 (1981). The United States Supreme Court has
granted certiorari to consider the question of whether Bid1hws applies to the resentencing of a
defendant who won apUate reversal of his fist conviction, in which a life sentence was entered
after the jury was unable to reach a verdict as to sentence. See Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 763
A.2d 359,367 (Pa. 2001) (holding that "[a] default judgment does not trigger a double jeopardybar
to the death penalty upon retrial"), wt grantaisub mn Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, _ US. _,
autale at No. 01-7574, 2002 WL 406987 (March 18, 2002).
82. Id at 437-38.
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atey preceding trial on the issue of guilt or innocence. It was itself a
til on the issue of punishment so precisely defined bythe Missouri
statutes.83
The existence of these "hallmarks of the trial on guilt or innocence," in the
Court's opinion, distinguished the Missouri capital sentencing procedure from
other sentencing procedures in which the Court had previously determined that
the Double Jeopardy Clause did not apply." Because capital juries in Nlissouri
were presented with the choie of one of two alternative sanctions, because their
determinations were made on the basis of the State's proof of additional facts,
and because the State had to prove those additional facts by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, the Court determined the proceeding was intended to protect
the interests of the defendant by excluding nearly all possibility of error.
Because the presence of trial characteristics persuaded the Bdllrgm court
to extend the restrictions of the Double JeopardyClause to capital sentencing by
jury, it follows that those characteristics also militate in favor of the presumption
of life. The BuL tw court regarded the State's burden of persuasion by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt as an important feature of the sentencing proceeding
which mandated the extension of guilt trial rights to the sentencing phase. In a
guilt trial, the presumption of innocence is the mechanism which ensures that the
State carries its burden. Because the reasonable doubt rule also applies at the
sentencing proceeding, a mechanism analogous to the presumption of inno-
cence-the presumption of life-is a necessaryprocedural safeguard in the sentenc-
ing proceeding.
C The Effa qfApprendi v. New Jersey
The United States Supreme Court's landmark ruling in Appmi v New
jeow9' provides the most substantial authority for the proposition that the
presumption of life is constitutionallyrequired.ar InApndi, the Court held that
any fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, which increases the penalty for
a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Appzmi essentially extends the
reasoning of Wvmhi to require the reasonable doubt rule to applyto sentencing
in cases in which aggravating factors expand the range of available penalties.
Although the Appmidi court explicitly distinguished a certain subset of capital
cases in which the judge must find the existence of a sentencing factor, the
83. It at 438.
84. Id. at 439-40.
85. Id at 441.
86. 530 US. 466 (2000).
87. Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 US. 466,490 (2000) (Mlustrating that a jurymust find proof
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central holding of the case suggests that when the decision belongs to the jury,
the prosecution must establish the existence of the factor beyond a reasonable
doubt.89
In his concurrence,Justice Thomas explained that facts which establish the
basis for imposing or increasing punishment are elements of the crime. This
reasoning supports the introduction of the presumption of life to capital sentenc-
ing. Justice Thomas's reasoning in Appwrli suggests that for purposes of due
process it is not enough to present evidence of aggravation and mitigation to the
jurywithout an ordering principle.9 Byaffirming that these facts bearing on the
89. Id at 496; sw id at 494; see also id at 498-99 (Scalia, J., concurring) ('What ultimately
demolishes the case for the dissenters is that theyare unable to saywhat the right to trial byjurydw
guarantee if, as theyassert, it does not guarantee-what it has been assumed to guarantee throughout
our history-the right to have a jury determine those facts that determine the maximum sentence
the law allows." (emphasis in original)); id at 521 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("If a fact is by law the
basis for imposing or increasing punishment-for establishing or increasing the prosecution's
entitlement-it is an element.").
In the opinion of the Court, Justice Stevens explained that Apmi does not have the effect
of "rende4ing] invalid state capital sentencing schemes requiring judges, after a juryverdict holding
a defendant guiltyof a capital crime, to find specific aggravating factors before imposing a sentence
of death." Id at 496. The Court referred to sentencing schemes in states such as Florida and
Arizona, in which the sentencing determination was left to the trial judge. Id In WauArv izrA,
the court upheld these sentencing schemes on the ground that the aggravating factors were not
separate elements of the offense, but rather "standards" to assist the trial judge in reaching his
determination. Walton v. Arizona, 497 US. 639,648 (1990).
Sentencing schemes, such as the scheme in place in Virginia, in which the jury must find the
presence of the aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt in order to impose a death sentence
are distinguishable. The Appmni majority articulatedi
[Iff a defendant faces punishment beyond that provided by statute when an offense is
committed under cerain circumstances but not others ... it necessarily follows that
the defendant should not-at the moment the State is put to proof of those circum-
stances-be deprived of protections that have, until that point, unquestionablyattached.
Appnm 530 US. at 484. Under Virginia's statute, and others like it, the maximum penalty for
capital murder is life' risonment, and that penaltymaybe elevated to death onlyon proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of future dangerousness or vileness. VA. CODE ANN.§192-264.4(Q (fichie
2000). Because of this requirement, the statutory aggravators in Virginia cannot be called guiding
standards for sentencing, but separate circumstances that lead to greater punishment. Therefore,
under Appinm, except to the extent that future dangerousness may be established by the fact of
prior convictions, the facts leading to an increase in penalty "beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Appm4 530 US.
at 490.
This distinction, however, may soon be moot, as the Supreme Court will reconsider Wam
in the coming term. Se Arizona v. Ring, 25 P3d 1139, 1150-51 (Ariz. 2001) (questioning the
validityof Watn in light of Appmni, but upholding Arizona capital sentencing scheme), at grama
122 S. Ct. 865 (2002) (No. 01-488).
90. Appnmd, 530 US. at 501 (Thomas, J., concurring).
91. SW id; seeaso United States v. Woodruff, 68 F. 536,538 D. Kan. 1895) (explaining that
when statute required a factual determination of the exact sum of a fine which maybe imposed, the
defendant is entitled to trial by jury).
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sentence are "elements," Appnmai essentially requires that the prosecution prove
its entitlement to the penalty sought.
The presumption of life animates the Appmzi requirement in capital
sentencing. Since the aggravating factors are in fact those things-elements-that
make a capital murder punishable bydeath, Appnmmi requires that these elements,
when submitted to a jury, be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The presum-
tion of life functions to ensure that the prosecution meets this burden before e
defendant may be sentenced to die.
V. 7he Vn~m Capil Svwwg Sdxm ITw am a Thwqmm jL 0
The provisions of the Code of Virginia that govern capital sentencing
indicate a strong legislative preference for life and suggest that the implementa-
tion of a presumption of life would be consistent with the goals of the legislature.
Section 192-264.4 reads, in pertinent part, that "[in case of trial by jury, where
a sentence of death is not recommended, the defendant shall be sentenced to
imprisonment for life."'2 This provision requires that punishment be fixed at life
imprisonment not only in those cases where the jury affirmatively recommends
a life sentence, but also in those instances in which a juryis deadlocked as to the
appropriate sentence 3 In the absence of unanimous agreement among the
jurors, the statute prefers the imposition of a life sentence.
Section 19.2-264.4, if read in its plain meaning, suggests that capital juries
should presume life.'4 A plain reading of the statute shows that the legislature
intended to impose the reasonable doubt rule on the Commonwealth's proof of
aggravation" Because the presumption of innocence is a natural corollaryto the
reasonable doubt rule, reading Section 19.2-264.4(C) to require the juryto err on
the side of the defendant could not be whollyinconsistent with the intent of the
legislature.' Moreover, a contrary reading would result in an absurd outcome.
The legislature clearly defined a reasonable doubt burden for the
Commonwealth's proof of the statutory aggravating factors; an interpretation
that would require the juryto applyits discretion in anymanner that did not give
the benefit of reasonable doubt to the defendant would be fundamentallyincon-
sistent.
92. VA. CODE ANN. S 191-264.4(A) (fichie 2000).
93. VA. CODE ANN. S 191-264.4(E) (Mchie 2000).
94. VA. CODE ANN. S 192-264.4 (Q (lchie 2000); sw ABNERJ. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN
INfTODUCnON To STAr1TIORYINTERPRETATION AND THE INIRPREnvE PROCESS 10 (1997)
(explaining that if the statute provides a clear answer the inquiry should end because the role of
courts is limited to enforcing the law as written).
95. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4 (Q.
96. Se MIxVA, s"pra note 94, at 10 (ilustating that courts will not apply the plain meaning
rule when such a reading would lead to a result clearlyinconsistent with the intent of the legisature).
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VI. (ndskbn
For all the procedural clarity that the presumption of life would impart to
capital sentencing, it is important to remember one final consideration. It is
better to let any number of men truly"guilty" of vile capital murder be sentenced
to life than to let one innocent man die. The criminal justice system in America
is predicated on the notion that an individual's libertyinterest is precious and that
the government must carry a heavy burden to deprive a person of that interest.
That same respect does not, however, always carry over when the individual
defendant is guilty of capital murder and the government seeks to impose the
death penalty.
The functional beauty of the presumption of innocence is its accessibility.
NearlyeveryAmerican citizen knows its meaning. The presumption is so widely
known that jurors in criminal cases have it in the backs of their minds as they
hear the evidence presented and as they deliberate. The technical language of
Section 19.2-264.4(Q, although plainly meaningful to lawyers, is not so simple
that it floats off the tongue as the words "innocent until proven guilty." Because
the courts expect jurors deftlyto handle these legal standards, the criminal justice
system ought to shape these standards into easily understood concepts. The
concept that the defendant should be presumed to receive a fife sentence unless
the prosecution proves otherwise is an easy standard. This is not to say that
juries mishandle the reasonable doubt standard in capital sentencing in epidemic
proportions. Rather, the possibilityof such an occurrence is sufficientlysubstan-
tial to warrant a consistent practice of instructing juries to presume life.
VII. Appatirc: Mwdd tP wu-ptc jL wy lrmiam
As you begin your deliberations, the law requires you to presume that the
defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment.97 Although you have found
the defendant guiltyof capital murder, your verdict is an insufficient basis for the
imposition of a death sentence.98 The Commonwealth bears the burden at all
times of establishing that the defendant constitutes a continuing serious danger
to society, that his conduct was wantonly vile, or both.9 You may not even
consider the imposition of a death sentence unless and until the prosecution has
met its burden. The defendant does not have a burden of producing any evi-
dence showing that the death penaltyis inappropriate, and you mayimpose a life
sentence on the presumption of life alone.'
97. Se VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(Q (MicOe 2000).
98. Seid; Ta*a, 436 US. at 485.
99. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(q.
100. Seeid
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